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Abstract: We explore the relationship of culture, regulation, and geographical factors with bilateral cross-
border bank lending. Using a newly compiled dataset on BIS-reporting banks’ activities, we find that 
geographical proximity, information flows and common institutional arrangements are the primary 
correlates of bilateral bank lending. Trust between individuals in the two countries matters only as a proxy 
for other cultural similarities.  The relationship between bank regulatory differences and lending flows has 
changed over time. Before the crisis, banks made more cross-border loans in countries with regulations that 
promoted market discipline and transparency, but took on more risk in countries that had less transparency, 
perhaps in pursuit of higher returns.   This relationship between transparency and banking flows has 
disappeared in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
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1 Introduction 
Cultural and regulatory similarities play an important role in shaping economic exchange between countries 
because they mitigate informational asymmetries (Guiso et al, 2009, Portes and Rey, 2005). In the case of 
financial transactions in particular, cultural and regulatory similarities reduce the costs associated with 
evaluating and monitoring borrowers and investment projects across borders. Geographic proximity may 
also play a role in reducing monitoring costs.  But, in a computerized global financial system with 
sophisticated means of managing risk, are factors like culture and geographic distance still relevant?  Can 
regulation substitute for trust?  Our research answers both these questions affirmatively, at least to some 
extent.  We find that geographic proximity and indicators of common institutional arrangements are 
associated with more cross-border lending and risk taking.  In contrast, we find only mixed evidence that 
indicators of common cultural heritage predict bilateral banking relationships.  Finally, we find that the 
relationship between some measures of regulatory similarity and cross-border flows of loans and risk has 
changed since the financial crisis.   
These results are important because recent developments in global financial innovation have the 
potential to change the nature of global banks’ lending and risk management practices. Previously, when 
banks in one country made loans to borrowers in another country, both the costs of doing business and the 
costs of monitoring have been concentrated in the borrower’s country. Recently, the increasing use of 
financial derivatives and third-party guarantees have made it so that banks have the ability to transfer a 
substantial amount of the risk associated with international lending to residents of a third country. The 
ability to do so enables banks to separate the profit implications of operating in a country with a similar 
culture or close geographic proximity from risk management concerns, and theoretically, this ability allows 
higher risk countries to become more integrated into the global financial system.  However, in spite of the 
growing amount of cross-border banking, we find that geography, culture, and common history or 
institutional arrangements still anchor these transactions.1 
                                                          
1 An alternative hypothesis may be that countries that trade with each other also have substantially more bilateral 
bank lending, to facilitate the trade relationships. As explained later, in alternative specifications we explicitly 
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In developing these results, our primary contribution is that we use a unique and detailed dataset 
on bilateral cross-border bank lending volumes, risk transfers, and guarantees to refine our understanding 
of the relationship between culture, geography, and regulation, and the patterns of cross-border financial 
transactions.  Our approach enhances the methods of others who have used gravity models to predict these 
bilateral transactions because we add to the set of the standard gravity model variables that proxy for 
cultural and regulatory similarities between the source and the host countries.   A third contribution allowed 
by our unique dataset is that we are able to examine the pre- and post-financial crisis periods separately – 
an important consideration in light of the apparent regime change in bank risk management practices 
(Temesvary, 2014; Berger and Bouwman 2013; Giannetti and Laeven, 2012).  
Our results show that institutional and historical measures, such as common legal origin, 
geographical proximity, communication, and colonial heritage have the strongest correlation with bilateral 
lending, relative to bilateral trust or bank regulatory arbitrage. Specifically, we find that bilateral trust 
between pairs of countries appears to be strongly and positively correlated with lending activity, but this 
significance goes away once we include other cultural factors that explain trust. Houston et al. (2012) show 
that regulatory arbitrage opportunities were important drivers of cross-border bank lending in the years 
leading up the financial crisis. We are able to ‘update’ these results by showing that there is no strong 
evidence on the role of bank regulatory differences (arbitrage opportunities) in driving bilateral bank 
lending in the aftermath of the crisis. Our results indicate that before the crisis, banks lent more direct loans 
to host countries whose regulatory framework promoted transparency in bank management practices, but 
also simultaneously took on more risk in less transparent countries, perhaps in search of higher returns. 
After the crisis, however, banks lent less and took on less risk in countries that had fewer restrictions on the 
activities in which banks can engage.  
Our use of a gravity model to examine the cultural, historical and geographical drivers of cross-
border bank lending flows brings together two strands of the literature. One strand of related literature 
                                                          
control for the role of bilateral trade relationships, and find that doing so does not take away from the significance of 
our main results.  
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examines the role of cultural connections and bilateral trust in driving cross-border economic transactions 
while the second explores gravity models of bilateral bank lending.  
Literature on cultural connections, trust, and economic transactions examines a variety of 
phenomena including trade in goods and services, foreign direct investment, portfolio flows, cross-border 
mergers, and migration.  (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2009; Ahern, Daminelli and Fracassi, 
(forthcoming); and Spring and Grossman, 2013).  There are a few papers that, like this one, study the 
relationship of trust and culture with cross-border banking, however, as we explain further below, the 
previous research examines a much more concentrated geographic area and only looks at cross-border asset 
flows and not the transfer of risk. 
In a seminal paper on the relationship between culture, trust, and economic exchange, Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales (2009) explore trade in goods and services, foreign direct investment, and portfolio 
flows between European countries.  They find that bilateral trust explains cross-border transactions well, 
even when they use cultural variables such as genetic distance, use of common language, or similar legal 
origins as instruments for trust between individuals of two countries. In a related finding, Guiso et al (2004) 
find that social capital plays an important role in the use of and access to financial services and investment. 
The effect of social capital, hence trust, is particularly important in areas where legal enforcement is weak. 
As mentioned above, a few authors have carried this line of investigation into the literature on the 
determinants of cross-border banking transactions.  The most closely related paper to ours is Buch, Driscoll 
and Ostergaard (2010) who examine the diversification of international asset portfolios for banks in five 
countries and find that higher bilateral trust is related to a country’s assets being over-weighted in banks’ 
portfolios as compared to a benchmark portfolio (with the benchmarks being determined by the CAPM).  
In another related paper, Heuchemer, Kleimeir, and Sander (2009) study cross-border lending within 
Europe and find a role for geography and cultural factors. More recently, Hahn (2013) studies cross-border 
lending from Austria to neighboring Eastern European Union members.  He also finds a role for common 
cultural heritage in explaining cross-border lending dynamics. Although all of these authors are interested 
in similar issues to the ones we address here, we argue that our work advances knowledge of the predictors 
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of cross-border banking because 1) we use a much larger set of countries in our data set rather than 
examining a small number of developed countries, and 2) we examine both cross-border lending and cross 
border transfer of risk.2  
Many of these papers use a gravity model to motivate a basic empirical specification.  Looking at 
small business lending practices, Breevort and Wolken (2009) find that the role of distance in lending varies 
substantially by bank type and over time. Even though the importance of physical distance has decreased 
in the past years, it remains an important factor in banking.  Breevort and Wolken (2009) survey some of 
the reasons why geographical and informational distance continues to matter in lending relationships. First, 
geographical distance limits banks’ ability to evaluate and monitor their clients, and also makes it costlier 
for clients to visit their bank. Second, informational distance increases the cost that banks incur in 
communicating with clients (potentially through third-party intermediaries), as well as the cost of 
evaluating lending prospects. Loans are sensitive to informational frictions (Daude and Fratzscher 2008), 
and informational asymmetries are particularly severe for commercial loans. For clients, informational 
distance raises the costs of searching for a potential lender. Overall, regulatory changes (such as removal 
of capital controls) and technological improvements (such as online banking) have reduced the role of 
geographic distance in banking. 
In addition to measures of cultural similarities and distance, Portes and Rey (2005) find that costs 
from informational asymmetry between borrower and lender (such as transaction costs) and measures of 
informational flows (such as bilateral telephone traffic) explain bilateral financial transactions well. Using 
a US-centered dataset, Portes et al (2001) find that these informational variables are particularly important 
in predicting the flow of assets with higher informational content, such as portfolio equities and corporate 
                                                          
2 Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) examine a related phenomenon—the cross border syndication of bank loans.  They 
find that cultural and geographic distance corresponds to higher lending rates, smaller loan amounts and 
requirements for third-party guarantees. Their paper differs from ours in several ways. First, the authors focus 
exclusively on the syndicated loan market to corporate borrowers, while we look at a broader set of loan types to 
various types of borrowers (banks, private clients, governments).  Second, the authors primarily focus on the impact 
of cultural distance on loan spreads (costs), while we primarily examine loan volumes. Third, the authors use a 
different set of culture-related descriptive variables than we do. 
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bonds.  In a related finding, Rose (2000) also finds that measures of institutional similarities (such as 
currency unions) are strongly positively related to trade. 
 
Our results are developed in the following three sections. In the next section, we describe the data; 
in Section 3 we present our main results, explore the potential role of heterogeneity in our results, and 
present robustness checks. Section 4 summarizes the results and provides a conclusion and potential 
extensions.  
 
2  Methods and Data  
Methods 
In order to investigate the determinants of cross-border lending, we estimate the following model 
Lendingi,j,t = β0 +β1Culturei,j,t + β2Geographyi,j,t + β3Institutionsi,j,t +                                         (1) 
β4Regulationi,j,t  β5Informationi,j,t + μi +γj +λt        
where Lendingi,j,t is claims originating from the source country, i, held in the destination country, j, at time, 
t.  As we explain in more detail below, we examine two types of lending:  immediate borrower lending and 
ultimate risk lending.  The former is actual loans made from the source to the destination country while the 
latter is the amount of risk that the source country takes in the destination country after adjusting the loan 
volumes for risk transfer through derivative contracts and loan guarantees. 
Culturei,j,t is a vector of variables that measures cultural similarities between the source and 
destination countries, Geographyi,j,t is a vector of variables that captures geographic relationships between 
the two countries, Institutionsi,j,t includes variables that capture institutional similarities, and Regulationi,j,t 
includes differences in regulatory policies in the two countries.  Because lending and risk taking may be 
more prevalent in countries in which the residents communicate with each other, we also include a proxy 
for information flows between the two countries.  Source country dummies, destination country dummies, 
and a time dummy are represented by μi, γj, and λt, respectively. In our set of explanatory variables, many 
covariates do not vary over time. However, the use of these time-invariant independent variables together 
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with fixed effects do not pose a problem because 1) our specification does not include dummies for source-
destination country pairs – only for source and destination countries separately; and 2) there is a large 
number of destination countries for each source country (188.50 on average), providing substantial cross-
sectional variation for these time-invariant covariates.   
As mentioned in the Introduction, it is important to address the potential role of bilateral trade 
relationships in driving cross-border lending. If two countries lend to each other to facilitate the cross-
border transaction of goods and services, then the inclusion of trade as an explanatory variable in the above 
empirical specification would be of primary importance. However, when we examine the potential role of 
trade in driving bilateral cross-border lending as a robustness check, we find that results from the 
specification in Equation (1) remain unchanged. In order to keep our econometric methodology comparable 
to the related literature, we therefore do not include trade in our main empirical specification. 
We estimate Equation 1 using panel data.  Data availability for regulatory differences and ultimate 
risk lending restricts our examination to two periods (2005-2006 and 2011-2012).  Fortunately, however, 
these two time periods allow us to examine both pre and post-crisis lending.  Although a Chow test does 
not reject the pooling assumption that all coefficients are jointly equal across time periods, in supplementary 
estimations we also estimate a SUR model in which we report separate coefficients for the two time periods 
in order to examine individual coefficients, especially the impact of bank regulation.  Finally, because our 
data does not record any lending volumes less than zero, we also confirm that our results are robust to 
estimating the relationships in Equation 1 with a Tobit model. 
 
Data 
Our two main dependent variables of interest consist of data on cross-border direct lending, and lending 
adjusted for cross-border risk transfers (as done through derivatives and guarantees). The majority 
(approximately 52 percent) of the cross-border loans are made to the non-financial private sector in the 
borrowing country.  Roughly one-third of the bilateral loans are made to banks, while the remaining loans 
are made to the public sector.  A little more than half (about 55 percent) of the loans are short term, with 
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maturities of less than one year, while the bulk of the remaining loans (39 percent of the total) have 
maturities over two years.  
All data on bilateral cross-border bank claims come from the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS)’s Consolidated Banking Statistics. Each BIS-reporting country reports consolidated foreign banking 
data by target country, on a bilateral basis.i All data are reported on a consolidated basis. The implication 
is that the lending is irrespective of where the loan is actually booked. With consolidated data, the location 
of the loan does not matter – only the nationality of the lender and borrower. For instance, if Bank of 
America makes a loan to the Japanese company Subaru in Germany of $60, then a loan directly to Japan of 
$40, the total value of American loans to Japan would be reported at $100, without mention of Germany. 
  It is important to clarify the difference between the “immediate borrower” and “ultimate risk” 
reporting of bank loans. For example, suppose that Bank of America’s U.S. headquarters makes a loan to 
Subaru, located in Japan, in the amount of $100. This loan will then be reported as a $100 immediate 
borrower loan between the US-Japan country pair. But now suppose that a fraction of this loan, in the 
amount $30, is securitized or underwritten by AIG, located in England. If the loan to Subaru were to default, 
then AIG in England would be ultimately responsible for the repayment of the securitized amount of $30. 
Therefore, the ultimate risk lending from the U.S. to England would be counted as $30. However, Subaru 
in Japan would still be responsible for the repayment of the unsecuritized part of the original loan, in the 
amount of $70. Therefore, the ultimate risk lending from the U.S. to Japan would be recorded as $70. 
Data on an “immediate borrower” basis is taken from Item 9B of the statistical release. This dataset 
captures the volume of foreign claims originating from any BIS-reporting country to any destination 
country. The BIS also reports data on an “ultimate risk” basis, which is Item 9D of the statistical release. 
Ultimate risk lending volumes are the actual (immediate borrower) loans, adjusted for risk transfers. 
Therefore, ultimate risk lending data captures the amount of claims a BIS-reporting country has in a 
destination country, but only the amount for the repayment of which the given destination country is 
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responsible.3 It follows that for any BIS-reporting source country, its “immediate borrower” claims in the 
destination country (Item 9B) plus the net risk transfer into the destination country makes up the source 
country’s “ultimate risk” amount of claims in the destination country (Item 9D). 
The lists of BIS-reporting (source) countries and recipient (destination, or host) countries are shown 
in the Appendix. There are a total of 29 reporting countries in the sample, and a total of 205 recipient 
countries. The average number of destination countries by reporting (source) country is 188.50. From these 
statistics, it is clear that the list of countries in the Appendix reveals that the set of reporting source countries 
closely overlaps with the set of OECD countries. As such, these nations tend to be developed and financially 
integrated. The set of recipient countries, on the other hand, shows substantial variation, both in terms of 
geographical location and economic and financial development. Since there are relatively few reporting 
(source) countries compared to the number of recipient countries, there is a strong “common lender” effect 
in cross-border bilateral lending data. To account for this fact, in addition to the source and destination 
country dummies mentioned above, we use as dependent variables the share of the given source country’s 
total outstanding foreign loans in that time period that go to each individual host country.  Furthermore, in 
order to smooth through quarterly fluctuations in lending we consider a “time period” to be two years.  
Thus, the lending data for each time period is the average of eight quarterly observations for each country 
pair in each time period.  We choose to smooth over seasonal fluctuations this way since it is our goal to 
abstract away from variation in lending due to within-year ups and downs or business cycle effects. 
 As mentioned above, our independent variables include sets of variables that capture common 
cultural, institutional, regulatory, information flows, and geographic characteristics between the source and 
destination countries.  More specifically, to proxy for common cultural characteristics, we include a dummy 
variable if the two countries share a common spoken language.  We also incorporate measures that may be 
                                                          
3 For instance, suppose that Bank of America makes a loan to Subaru in Japan of $100 – this is reported as the 
immediate borrower amount between the US-Japan pair. But now suppose that $30 of this loan is securitized by a 
British company. Then Britain is ultimately responsible for the repayment of this $30, while Japan remains 
ultimately responsible for $70. Then the ultimate risk database would report a $30 loan from the US to Britain, and 
$70 from the US to Japan. 
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more indirect measures of shared culture.  These include a variable measuring genetic distance between 
indigenous populations4 and a dummy variable indicating if the source country is a former colony of the 
destination country.  These indirect measures may more be indicators of shared culture, and, in fact, Guiso 
et al. (2009) use these indirect measures of culture as instruments for bilateral trust.  We do not follow that 
same estimation strategy for our entire set of countries because bilateral trust data is not available. However, 
for a subset of our sample that contains European countries, we are able to use a measure of bilateral trust 
from Guiso et al. (2009) and in some estimations use these indirect measures of culture as instruments for 
trust in the European sample.   
In addition to shared culture measures, we include several other variables as well.  To proxy for 
common institutional characteristics we include dummy variables indicating if two countries share a 
common legal origin and if they use a common currency.5  Geographic relationships between two countries 
are captured in a variable measuring the distance between two countries (weighted by population location) 
and a dummy variable equal to one if the two countries are contiguous.6  
As a proxy for information flows, we also include phone traffic between the two countries as 
measured by the percent of all incoming calls to the source country made by the destination country.7 While 
phone traffic is a commonly used proxy for information flows in the gravity literature, a potential concern 
regarding the use of this measure is the extent to which bilateral phone traffic may be endogenous to the 
volume of bilateral economic transactions: two countries that engage in extensive trading or lending may 
call each other more to facilitate such transactions.  However, we use phone traffic data from the 2006 
edition of Telegeography, which reports data for the 2004-2005 calendar years. Therefore, our phone traffic 
                                                          
4 This measure was developed by Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza (1996), and is based on the existence of 
genetic or DNA polymorphism (a situation in which a gene or a DNA sequence exist in at least two different forms. 
5 We do not explicitly include exchange rates for two reasons. First, the majority of cross-border banking 
transactions are in one of the reserve currencies of the world (USD, EUR) as opposed to the currency of the recipient 
country. Second, the BIS reports all loan volumes converted into U.S. dollars. 
6 We weight the distance by population so that relatively more “important” cities are weighted more heavily in 
determining how far apart the countries are. 
7 An alternative specification would be to measure the source country’s outgoing phone traffic to a given destination 
country as the share of all calls going out of the source country. However, due to reporting limitations in the 
Telegeography publication, doing so would result in a substantial loss of available data. 
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data predates the first years of our lending data (2006-2007). This, together with the fact that phone traffic 
data varies substantially from year to year8, alleviates concerns about reverse causality. Nonetheless, we 
are cautious in interpreting the relationship as causal.  
We also include a set of explanatory variables that capture similarities in bank regulatory 
frameworks between pairs of countries. Data on regulations are collected from the online database 
compiled, described and provided by Barth et al. (2013). This dataset contains survey data on bank 
regulation, supervision, and monitoring in over 100 countries. The dataset used in this paper is collected 
from the last two global surveys on bank regulation and supervision among national bank and financial 
regulators. The first survey used in this paper was published in 2007, pertaining to the global regulatory 
situation as in 2005 and 2006. The second survey we use was published in 2012, giving a snapshot of the 
post-crisis regulatory framework around the world.  
While there is substantial variation in the questions over time, the surveys consist of over 300 
questions on the stringency of capital regulation, entry regulation, activities restrictions, supervisory power 
and independence, external governance and monitoring at the country level. The two surveys combined 
provide a very detailed overview of the stringency of bank supervision and regulation around the world 
before and after the financial crisis. 
Our goal is to construct measures of regulatory differences between source and recipient countries. 
Therefore, for each regulatory measure the host country’s regulatory indicator is subtracted from the source 
country’s values. Therefore, our regulatory measures should be interpreted as the relative regulatory 
stringency of the source countries. As such, positive values of these regulatory difference measures indicate 
that the source country is stricter than the destination country. Negative values, on the other hand, indicate 
a relatively stricter destination country regulator. We examine bank regulatory differences along three 
dimensions: “supervisory power” is an index of official supervisory power, i.e. whether the supervisory 
authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems. The “activity 
                                                          
8 As compared to the previous editions of Telegeography, phone traffic data varies substantially. In addition, the list 
of “top callers” for our source countries that is reported in Telegeography varies significantly over time as well. 
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restrictions” index measures overall restrictions on banking activities – more specifically the extent to 
which banks may engage in the underwriting and dealing of securities and insurance products, and 
investment in real estate. Finally, the “private monitoring” variable measures whether there are incentives 
or ability for the private monitoring of banks. This is a measure of the extent to which the public is made 
aware of regulatory actions taken against banks, and the extent to which banks are required to disclose their 
risk management and off balance sheet practices. 
All of our data is summarized in Tables 1 through 3.  Table 1 provides a detailed description of the 
variables and data sources, Table 2 gives summary statistics and Table 3 shows averages by time period.  
These statistics indicate that, on average, bilateral lending is fairly well diversified across destination 
countries with the average share of immediate borrowing lending being only 2 percent and ultimate risk 
lending 1.8 percent of the share of loans from the source country.  While it is true that the maximum 
percentage for each type of lending to one country is much higher (78 percent of total loans for one source 
country for immediate borrowing lending and 67 percent for ultimate risk lending), this is not typical.  In 
fact, the 95th percentile for immediate borrower lending is 10 percent and for ultimate risk lending it is only 
9.8 percent.  In other words, for a country pair that is in the 95th percentile, that immediate borrower lending 
represents only 10 percent of the cross border immediate borrower lending for that source country.  The 
trends in Table 3 show that while the dollar volume of loans increased over the two time periods, the percent 
of the total loans from the source countries remained essentially unchanged. 
 
3 Results 
3.1 Main Specification 
We present results of the estimation of Equation 1 in Table 4.  Columns 1 through 5 present results for 
immediate borrower lending and columns 6 through 10 provide results for ultimate risk lending.  In the first 
column for each type of lending, we include our most basic specification which includes measures of culture 
(common spoken language), institutional arrangements (common legal system and common currency), and 
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information flows (phone calls).  In the second column (columns 2 and 6), we add variables that are more 
indirect measures of common culture (genetic distance, years at war, and colonial ties).   
 We find several interesting results that are generally similar for both types of lending.  Our first 
result of note is that geography matters.  Both contiguous and distance enter in the ultimate risk (UR) and 
immediate borrower (IB) regressions in expected ways.  More specifically, source countries lend a 
significantly greater share of both types of loans to contiguous host countries. Furthermore, the farther the 
host country is from the source country, the smaller is the share of both types of lending that it can receive. 
These variables remain significant, even after controlling for cultural and institutional factors.  The 
magnitudes of these effects are reasonable, but also notable.  For example, the results in Column 1 of Table 
4 suggest that contiguous borrowers receive a .69 percentage points higher share of immediate borrower 
loans from lenders.   Given that the average share for any one country pair is two percent, this is a 
meaningful increase. While these results are in line with the “gravity” literature on trade, we contribute by 
showing that such gravity effects prevail in the case of banking claims across a large range of countries as 
well. In this context, these results are consistent with the theory that geographic proximity reduces 
monitoring costs. 
Second, we find evidence that common institutional arrangements matter in expected ways.  
Specifically, source countries allocate a significantly greater share of their UR and IB lending to countries 
that share the same legal system (French vs. Anglo-Saxon, etc.). The magnitude of the coefficient in Column 
1 indicates that the economic significance of this effect is similar to the country pairs sharing a border. To 
the extent that contracts are easier to write and enforce, and litigation is easier to manage in familiar legal 
environments, this result is easier to interpret in the case of financial assets than in the trade literature. 
Interestingly, we do not find any evidence that sharing a common currency is strongly related to loan shares.  
This suggests that the financial markets have provided sufficient tools to mitigate currency risk and any 
transaction costs associated with foreign exchange.  One reason that we find this result for bilateral bank 
loans but Rose (2000) does not find it for trade in goods and services is that the lending banks may already 
be active participants in currency markets and have fairly low transaction costs in hedging currency risk. 
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An alternative explanation is that sharing a common currency does not matter if the majority of cross-border 
loans are denominated in one of the global reserve currencies (US dollars or Euros).9   
In contrast to the result that foreign exchange does not matter, information exchange clearly does.  
Information exchange and communication as measured by phone traffic is strongly positively correlated 
with bank lending.  Using phone traffic data from the 1990s, previous papers have shown that this 
relationship exists for bilateral trade and FDI & FPI (Portes and Rey, 2005). Our analysis uses an updated 
phone traffic database to show that higher bilateral phone traffic corresponds to significantly more bank 
lending as well. And, the coefficient is quite large:  The results in Column 1 of Table 4 indicate that a one 
standard deviation increase in Phone Calls (4.5 percent) is associated with a 3.1 percentage point increase 
in the share of immediate borrower loans. 
We find mixed results for shared culture.  Our only direct measure of shared culture (common 
spoken language) is insignificant in all the estimations.  However, when we add indirect measures of shared 
culture we obtain some significant results.  The one (indirect) measure of shared culture that enters 
significantly and in the expected way is the shared colonial history.  If the source country is a former colony 
of the destination country, then both types of lending are significantly higher.  Results in Column 2 and 6 
of Table 4 indicate that this type of colonial relationship corresponds to a by 4.2 percentage points higher 
share of immediate borrower lending and a 7.9 percentage points higher share of ultimate risk lending by.  
Again, given that the average shares for these two types of lending are around 2 percent, these effects are 
quite large.  It is notable that this variable retains significance even after controlling for common legal 
origin, suggesting that this relationship captures more than just institutional similarities.  The second 
indirect measure of shared culture is genetic distance.  This variable enters the regressions inconsistently, 
prohibiting us from drawing any conclusions about the relationship between genetic distance and cross-
border lending. Finally, none of the measures of differences in regulatory practices enter our pooled 
regressions significantly.  However, as we explain below, we explore this relationship in greater detail by 
                                                          
9 Unfortunately, our data does not include information about the currency denomination of the loans.  The BIS 
converts all loans to $US for reporting purposes. 
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examining pre and post-crisis results to allow for the possibility that the effect of regulations on bank 
lending has changed over time.   
 
3.2 Alternative specifications and robustness checks 
In this section, we explore some alternative specifications to qualify and add to our main results. We start 
by exploring the additional role that bilateral trust plays beyond cultural and historical ties, using a 
subsample of our data for which such a measure is available. We move on to examine the issue of time 
dependence in the relationship between bank regulatory similarities and bank lending. In addition to 
conducting some robustness checks, we also explore the extent to which our results may depend on the 
target sector of bank lending. 
Incorporating bilateral trust 
As mentioned previously, several authors have explored how bilateral trust relates to economic exchange.  
However, in our full sample bilateral trust data is not available and we must confine ourselves to including 
as independent variables country characteristics that have been used as predictors of bilateral trust.  
However, direct measures of bilateral trust from survey data are available for a subsample of European 
countries from Guiso et al (2009).10  We replace the variables that were indirect measures of trust between 
two countries (genetic distance and colonial relationship) with the bilateral trust data in estimations that are 
reported in Table 5.  In columns 1 through 5 of Table 5, we present results from OLS estimation of 
immediate borrower lending.  In column 6, we instrument for trust with variables from Guiso et al. (2009) 
that they show are predictors of trust (genetic distance, number of years at war between 1000 and 1970, and 
differences in GDP).  Similarly, in columns 7 through 11, results for ultimate risk lending appear and, in 
column 12, we again instrument for trust in the estimation of ultimate risk lending. 
                                                          
10 The underlying data is from the Eurobarometer survey sponsored by the European Commission.  The data is from 
a question that asked individuals to rate how much they trusted citizens from a number of other European countries, 
on a four-point scale.   
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 The results in Table 5 indicate that when no other control variables are used (columns 1 and 7), 
bilateral trust is significantly and positively related to both immediate borrower and ultimate risk lending.  
However, as control variables for geography, common institutional arrangements, information exchange, 
and regulatory similarities are added, the relationship between bilateral trust and both types of lending loses 
significance.   These results also hold when we instrument for trust (columns 6 and 12).  Thus, the lack of 
evidence for a strong link between shared culture and bank lending in the broader sample is duplicated in 
the European sample. 
 In addition, most of our larger sample conclusions are supported with the results of the European 
sample.  Specifically, we find a strong positive effect for shared institutional arrangements via the effect of 
a common legal system and a strong positive effect for information exchange as proxied by phone calls.  
The role of distance is also confirmed, with countries that are farther from each other experiencing less 
bilateral lending.  An interesting difference, however, is that in the European subsample, sharing a common 
border with a destination country is not significantly correlated with increased lending there.  Because of 
the extent of the integration of European Union economies, sharing a border in this region may not have as 
much economic significance as in a broader sample of countries. 
Separating time periods 
Although our main results are from a specification in which we pool observations across time periods and 
control for differential effects of the two time periods with a time fixed-effect, we also check to see if our 
results are robust to estimating separate coefficients for each time period using SUR analysis.  Because one 
of our time periods is pre-crisis and one is post-crisis, this method has the advantage of removing the 
restriction that the coefficients on all of the explanatory variables are constant both before and after the 
financial crisis. 11   A disadvantage, however, is that the sample used to estimate each coefficient is 
significantly reduced because we can only use observations in which we have data for both time periods.  
                                                          
11 As we reported earlier, a Chow test does not allow us to reject this restriction when jointly imposed on all the 
coefficients.  In the SUR analysis, however, we test the restriction on specific coefficients individually.   
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We present the SUR results for immediate borrower lending in Table 6A and for ultimate risk lending in 
Table 6B. 
 The results in Table 6A and 6B confirm several of our earlier results:  the importance of information 
exchange, geography, and colonial relationships are all borne out in SUR estimations.  Interestingly, 
however, the evidence for the role of common legal systems is weaker, but the evidence for the effect of 
different regulatory practices is stronger.  While loss of significance of the common legal system variable 
may in part be due to a smaller sample size, the pre and post-crisis impact of differing regulatory practices 
are consistent with bank behavior being affected by the crisis, as shown by Berger and Bouwman (2013) 
among others. 
Examination of the role of bank regulatory considerations by time period reveals some interesting 
patterns. First, the negative coefficient on private monitoring in Column 3 in Table 6A and the positive 
coefficient in Column 3 in Table 6B indicate that relatively stricter private monitoring in the destination 
country corresponds to significantly more immediate borrower lending, but significantly less ultimate risk 
lending, to the destination country in the pre-crisis period.12 The interpretation is that banks lend more direct 
loans to host countries that have strict and well-enforced transparency laws in place, such as requirements 
for banks to reveal risk management practices and off-balance sheet activities. At the same time, banks 
were also willing to take on more risk in countries that had relatively weaker transparency laws during the 
pre-crisis period.  There is no evidence of these effects in the post-crisis period.  Why would less transparent 
banking practices be associated with banks being willing to take on more risk?  One possibility is that rates 
of return were higher in countries with less transparent practices, enticing banks to take on more risk.  
Although our data does not contain information on rates of return to loans to specific countries, we can use 
stock market returns as a proxy for rate of return to bank loans to investigate this channel (Buch et al, 2010).  
                                                          
12 Recall that the regulation variables are the differences in a regulatory index calculated by taking the source 
country value minus the destination country value.  Thus, a positive difference indicates that the source country has 
stricter regulation. 
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We find that, in fact, lower levels of private monitoring are associated with higher stock market returns.13  
Post-crisis, we find a similar correlation between transparency regulation and stock market returns, 
however, we find no evidence of the effect of transparency regulation on banks’ willingness to take on risk 
in a specific country during the later time period. Perhaps the financial crisis sensitized banks to taking on 
risk when there is less transparency and the risk could not be as well understood. 
Differences in regulatory restrictions on banking activities also appear to have a differential 
relationship with cross-border bank lending pre and post-crisis.  In the earlier time period, we find no effect 
of differences in regulatory restrictions on banking activities for either immediate borrower or ultimate risk 
lending (Column 5 of Tables 6A and 6B).  However, post-crisis, there is a fairly strong negative effect, with 
banks being less likely to lend on either an immediate borrower or an ultimate risk basis to countries which 
allow banks to engage in a greater variety of activities.  This result is consistent with banks being more 
sensitized to risk as a result of the financial crisis and being less willing to lend in countries in which the 
banking sector might be associated with greater risk. Based on these results, we do not find evidence of 
regulatory arbitrage in the post-crisis period. 
Tobit estimation 
In addition to the SUR estimation, we also explore if our results are robust to an additional specification 
that might be suggested by the nature of the data.  One important issue to explore is that there is a small 
number of observations in our larger dataset that have zero entries for bilateral bank flows. This fact raises 
concerns about the effect of left-censoring of the data. To determine if this affects our conclusions, we 
estimate a Tobit model with our pooled dataset used to generate our main results. The Tobit specification 
yields results that are very close to the pooled specification presented in Table 4 and we do not present them 
in detail here.  
Accounting for international trade 
                                                          
13 Specifically, in the pre-crisis period, an increase in the private monitoring index of one is associated with a 
decrease in the annual stock market returns of 2.9 percentage points.  This effect is significant at the one percent 
level. 
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 Because our specification incorporates the ideas behind a gravity model, we would also expect that 
many of our explanatory variables would be significant in predicting trade volumes.  However, it could also 
be the case that international trade is an omitted variable in our specification if bank lending follows trading 
patterns (as discussed in Aviat and Coeurdacier, 2007).  For example, if banks are lending to finance 
exports, then we might expect that variables that predict trade would also predict bank lending.  To 
determine if our main results are really being driven by the connection between our explanatory variables 
and trade, we re-estimate the results in Table 4, adding a measure of export share in each estimation. 
Specifically, export share is the share of exports of the source country (the lending country) that go to the 
destination country (the borrowing country).  The calculation of this variable parallels that of the lending 
variable.   
The results are shown in Appendix Table 1.  As can be seen in this table, higher export shares 
correspond to significantly higher lending shares in all ten specifications.  However, our major conclusions 
discussed above remain.  While the inclusion of the export share reveals the relationship between 
contiguous and bank lending to be less robust, distance between countries remains significant in all 
estimations, arguing for a role for geography.  Furthermore, in this new set of estimations, common legal 
system becomes significant in all estimations, making this result a bit sharper.  Overall, while we do find 
evidence that trade and bank lending move together, this relationship does not completely explain the 
effects of geography, common institutional arrangements, shared colonial history, and information 
exchange. 
Target sector-specific estimation 
The considerations that go into banks’ choices of how much to lend to a given country may also 
depend on the target sector of lending. For instance, there may be substantial differences in the intensity of 
monitoring that is necessary for a loan going to another large bank across borders, versus a private 
individual abroad. Informational asymmetries inherent in cross-border lending may be less severe when 
lending takes place between banks (Hale 2012). Furthermore, loans to governments might be motivated by 
political considerations as well. In light of these differences, it is important to explore the extent to which 
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our results might vary by the target sector of lending in a host country. While such sector-specific 
breakdown is not available in our main data, we are able to investigate this issue using a different dataset 
on U.S. banks’ foreign lending.  
This supplemental dataset, compiled from regulatory sources, provides information on U.S. banks’ 
immediate borrower and ultimate risk bilateral lending to three sectors in each host country: the banking 
sector, the non-financial private sector and the public sector. While this dataset is valuable in that it provides 
sector-specific lending data, it is important to keep in mind that such data is only available for one source 
country: the United States. Because of this, there are many limitations on our ability to investigate all of the 
independent variables that we use in our main specifications.  Specifically, none of the destination countries 
for U.S. bank loans share a common currency, only two destination countries are contiguous, and there are 
only three destination countries from which the U.S. was colonized.  Therefore, we exclude these variables 
from our estimation due to their limited variation.  In addition, because we only have one source country 
and, at most, two observations for each destination country, we are unable to include fixed effects for the 
destination countries and the source country.  Instead, we estimate a country specific random effect for 
destination countries of U.S. cross-border bank claims. 
We obtain similar results for both immediate borrower lending and ultimate risk lending so only 
report in detail the results of the ultimate risk lending in Tables 7A (banking sector), 7B (public sector), 
and 7C (non-financial private sector).14  There are a few broad conclusions that can be drawn from these 
results.  First, information exchange, as measured by cross-border phone calls remains positively and 
significantly associated with all types of lending.  Second, there are some differences in the variables that 
are associated with lending to different sectors.  Lending to the banking sector seems to be positively related 
to sharing a common language.  Sharing a common language does not have a statistically significant 
relationship to lending to the public sector and is significant in only one of the specifications that examines 
lending to the private sector.  In addition, sharing a common legal origin is negatively related to loans to 
                                                          
14 Detailed results for immediate borrower lending are available from the authors upon request. 
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the public sector.  This result is in contrast to the results we obtained with our broader data set and may be 
an artifact of examining only data from U.S. banks. Many of the other countries in the data set that share a 
common legal origin with the U.S. are also former British colonies, many of them with less stable 
governments. 
In sum, although the results in Table 7 suggest that cross-border lending to different sectors may 
be related to different factors, data limitations prohibit strong conclusions.  Because this data is available 
for only one source country, the sample size is significantly reduced and idiosyncratic features of the source 
country may influence the results.  
4 Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper, we explore the relationship between culture, institutional arrangements, information 
exchange, regulations and geographical factors on the one hand, and bilateral cross-border bank lending on 
the other. Using a newly compiled dataset on BIS-reporting banks’ activities, we find that geography, 
institutional arrangements and communication are the primary correlates of bilateral lending flows. We find 
very little evidence that cultural similarities play a role.   
Our results are consistent with the idea that the relationship between cross-country regulatory 
differences and bank lending has changed over time. Before the crisis, banks lent more to countries with 
regulations promoting and enabling market discipline, but took on more ultimate risk exposure in countries 
with less transparent banking laws. There is evidence to suggest that banks were willing to do so in search 
of higher returns on their claims. In the aftermath of the crisis, this pattern disappears. Instead, in the post-
crisis period we find that banks lend less in countries with fewer restrictions on banking activities. 
Therefore, we do not find evidence that banks are engaging in regulatory arbitrage to avoid the 
consequences of tighter restrictions on banking activity in the aftermath of the crisis. This is interesting in 
light of the fact that there is evidence of regulatory arbitrage leading up to the financial crisis (Houston et 
al, 2012). Results suggest that of the relationship between geographic, institutional and regulatory factors 
and cross-border bank lending depends on the target sector as well: lending to other banks and the private 
sector relates to these factors similarly, while public sector lending is different. 
21 
 
An important consideration, which we are not able to tackle due to data limitations, is the difference 
between cross-border vs. foreign affiliate-based lending. Much of the trust-based sorting may already 
happen along the lines of local (subsidiary)-based vs. cross-border based lending. Local lending allows 
closer monitoring of the borrowers and loans. However, setting up an office is a major commitment that 
might be risky if the political and economic climate is very different. Therefore, an interesting extension 
would be to examine how these same factors relate to whether lending occurs via cross-border loans vs. 
local affiliates.   
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Definition Source 
   
IB percent Percent of source country's IB lending 
to destination country 
Bank for International for 
Settlements (BIS) 
UR percent Percent of source country's ultimate 
risk lending to destination country 
BIS 
Common language =1 if common spoken language Mayer and Ries (2010) 
Contiguous =1 if share a border Mayer and Ries (2010) 
Distance Distance weighted by population Mayer and Ries (2010) 
   
Common legal =1 if have common legal origins Mayer and Ries (2010) 
Common currency =1 if have common currency Mayer and Ries (2010) 
Phone calls incoming phone calls from destination 
to source country as a percent of total 
incoming phone calls to source country 
Telegeography’s Global 
Telecommunications Traffic 
Statistics, 2006 
Genetic distance Fst genetic distance Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) 
Destination Colony =1 if source country a former colony of 
destination country 
Mayer and Ries (2010) 
Relative Supervisory 
Power (source - host) 
Supervisory Power index of source 
country minus supervisory power index 
of destination country 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2005), 
updated 
Relative Private 
Monitoring (source - host) 
Private monitoring index of source 
country minus private monitoring 
index of destination 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2005), 
updated 
Relative Banking 
Restriction (source - host) 
restrictions on banking activities of 
source country minus restrictions in 
destination country 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2005), 
updated 
Bilateral trust Trust from source to destination 
country residents 
Guiso, Sapienza and Gonzales 
(2009) 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
IB percent 1375 2.0213 5.6048 0 0.776931 
UR percent 1249 1.8679 5.1178 0 0.673221 
Common language 1375 0.348864 0.327721 0 1 
Contiguous 1375 0.088727 0.284453 0 1 
Distance 1375 5006.319 4202.942 160.9283 19781.39 
      
Common legal 1375 0.353455 0.478216 0 1 
Common currency 1375 0.110546 0.313683 0 1 
Phone calls 1375 01.7352 4.5399 2.37E-06 0.45298 
Genetic distance 1343 525.4535 622.9934 0 2292 
Destination Colony 1375 0.010182 0.100427 0 1 
Relative Supervisory Power 
(source - host) 
1113 0.091644 0.82489 -2 2 
Relative Private Monitoring 
(source - host) 
988 -0.91903 2.800261 -9 7 
Relative Banking Restriction 
(source - host) 
944 -0.56144 2.201522 -9 7 
Bilateral trust 153 2.786144 0.282547 2.13 3.65 
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Table 3: Averages by time period 
Variable  Mean  
  2006-2007 2011-2012 
    
IB lending as a percent of total 1.9608 2.083 
UR lending as a percent of total 1.8075 1.9298 
IB lending in dollars  22262.67 27007.97 
UR lending in dollars  24093.4 29194.09 
Relative Supervisory Power (source - host) -0.00515 0.198113 
Relative Private monitoring (source - host) -1.38202 -0.37445 
Relative Banking restrictions (source - host) -0.67424 -0.41827 
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Table 4:  Full Sample Results 
           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Immediate Borrower Lending Ultimate Risk Lending 
Common Language -0.6908 -0.4949 -0.4753 -0.196 -0.1437 -0.3871 -0.372 -0.3267 0.0168 0.1329 
 (0.51) (0.51) (0.56) (0.61) (0.66) (0.57) (0.57) (0.61) (0.67) (0.70) 
Contiguous 0.6879* 0.7600* 1.0425** 1.0492** 1.0865** 0.9798** 0.8153* 1.0917** 1.2165** 1.2132** 
 (0.40) (0.39) (0.41) (0.48) (0.50) (0.43) (0.42) (0.44) (0.52) (0.53) 
Distance -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Common Legal 0.6498** 0.6918*** 0.6688** 0.7164** 0.7826** 0.5867** 0.5696** 0.4746 0.5358 0.5909* 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.32) (0.34) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.33) (0.34) 
Common Currency 0.0911 0.382 -0.2671 -0.3218 -0.4109 -0.2348 0.1212 -0.5675 -0.4361 -0.4889 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.52) (0.58) (0.59) (0.47) (0.47) (0.49) (0.55) (0.56) 
Phone Calls 0.6960*** 0.6943*** 0.6286*** 0.6364*** 0.6382*** 0.6797*** 0.7154*** 0.6390*** 0.6311*** 0.6269*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Genetic Distance  0.0007** 0.0007* 0.0006 0.0006   0.0007 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Destination Colony  4.1762*** 4.6960*** 3.5482*** 3.5334***   7.9172*** 7.0944*** 5.6081*** 5.5750*** 
  (0.97) (1.01) (1.09) (1.12)   (1.10) (1.10) (1.21) (1.24) 
Relative Supervisory  
Power (source - host)   -0.0187      -0.0267   
   (0.21)      (0.21)   
Relative Banking 
Restrictions (source - 
host)     -0.0559      -0.082 
     (0.10)      (0.11) 
Relative Private 
Monitoring (source - 
host)    -0.0508      -0.0756  
        (0.09)         (0.09)   
Observations 1375 1343 1091 962 918 1281 1250 1010 887 848 
R-squared 0.69 0.7 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.65 0.67 0.7 0.71 0.71 
Standard errors in parentheses.  ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10; all estimations include dummy variables for time, source country  
and destination country. 
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    Table 5: European subsample 
             
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  Immediate Borrower Lending Ultimate Risk Lending 
Bilateral Trust 9.302*** 3.895* 3.477 3.883* 3.457 -17.585 8.492** 3.248 2.893 3.226 2.852 -19.348 
 (3.43) (2.16) (2.32) (2.17) (2.33) (24.38) (3.27) (2.07) (2.21) (2.08) (2.21) (24.52) 
Common 
Language  -1.099 -1.682 -1.08 -1.699 -0.69   -1.117 -1.643 -1.081 -1.673 -0.687 
  (1.07) (1.21) (1.08) (1.21) (1.58)   (1.03) (1.15) (1.03) (1.15) (1.59) 
Distance  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006**   -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Contiguous  0.615 1.5 0.615 1.517 0.365   0.692 1.618 0.693 1.62 0.429 
  (0.94) (1.10) (0.94) (1.10) (1.35)   (0.90) (1.05) (0.90) (1.05) (1.36) 
Phone Calls  0.168** 0.163** 0.167** 0.163** 0.277*   0.191*** 0.184*** 0.189*** 0.185*** 0.305* 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15)   (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.16) 
Common Legal  1.674*** 1.713** 1.661*** 1.704** 2.048**   1.797*** 1.777*** 1.773*** 1.785*** 2.191** 
  (0.63) (0.67) (0.63) (0.67) (0.98)   (0.60) (0.64) (0.60) (0.64) (0.99) 
Relative Private 
Monitoring 
(source - host)   0.025       -0.057    
   (0.19)       (0.18)    
Relative Banking Restrictions 
(source - host)    -0.067       -0.096  
     (0.37)       (0.35)  
Relative Supervisory 
Power (source - host)    -0.098       -0.185   
        (0.33)           (0.31)     
Observations 153 127 118 127 118 127 153 127 118 127 118 127 
R-squared 0.49 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.67 0.48 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.66 
Standard errors in parentheses.  ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10; all estimations include dummy variables for time, source country and 
destination country.  Columns 6 and 12 estimated via IV estimation.  Instruments for trust are from Guiso et al (2009):  genetic distance, fraction of years at war 
and difference in GDP.
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Table 6A: SUR specification – Immediate borrower basis 
 
       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  2006-2007 2011-2012 2006-2007 2011-2012 2006-2007 2011-2012 
Common Language -0.788 -0.425 0.108 0.228 0.472 0.571 
 (0.79) (0.89) (0.96) (1.11) (1.04) (1.20) 
Contiguous 0.793 1.347** 0.974 1.535* 0.942 1.503 
 (0.57) (0.64) (0.79) (0.92) (0.82) (0.95) 
Distance -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Common Legal 0.38 0.875* 0.39 1.141* 0.54 1.431** 
 (0.42) (0.47) (0.51) (0.59) (0.55) (0.64) 
Common Currency -0.136 -0.157 -0.249 -0.493 -0.395 -0.709 
 (0.73) (0.82) (0.90) (1.04) (0.94) (1.08) 
Phone Calls 0.640*** 0.595*** 0.612*** 0.617*** 0.611*** 0.617*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Genetic Distance 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Destination Colony 6.019*** 6.466*** 2.908* 4.867** 2.83 4.829** 
 (1.42) (1.60) (1.69) (1.96) (1.74) (2.02) 
Relative Supervisory 
Power (source - host) -0.898 -0.382     
 (1.38) (1.51)     
Relative Private 
Monitoring (source - host)   -0.917*** -0.32   
   (0.35) (0.32)   
Relative Banking 
Restrictions (source - host)     -0.15 -3.087*** 
          (0.47) (0.50) 
p-value for null hypothesis 
that the coefficients on 
regulation variables are 
equal across time periods 0.69 0.16 0.000 
Observations 488 488 372 372 347 347 
Standard errors in parentheses.  ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10; all estimations include 
dummy variables for time, source country and destination country
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Table 6B: SUR specification – Ultimate Risk basis 
       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  2006-2007 2011-2012 2006-2007 2011-2012 2006-2007 2011-2012 
Common Language -0.102 -0.014 1.062 1.006 1.332 1.32 
 (0.87) (0.94) (1.04) (1.16) (1.08) (1.22) 
Contiguous 0.749 1.491** 1.045 1.702* 0.923 1.589 
 (0.61) (0.66) (0.89) (0.99) (0.91) (1.03) 
Distance -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Common Legal 0.201 0.499 0.147 0.61 0.32 0.775 
 (0.42) (0.45) (0.52) (0.58) (0.55) (0.63) 
Common Currency -0.645 -0.422 -0.22 -0.217 -0.362 -0.344 
 (0.69) (0.74) (0.84) (0.94) (0.88) (0.99) 
Phone Calls 0.646*** 0.569*** 0.599*** 0.589*** 0.585*** 0.574*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Genetic Distance 0 0.001 -0.001 0 -0.001 0 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Destination Colony 6.981*** 8.480*** 2.814 6.018*** 2.737 6.000*** 
 (1.50) (1.61) (1.81) (2.03) (1.87) (2.11) 
Relative Supervisory 
Power (source - host) 0.004 -1.323     
 (0.51) (1.67)     
Relative Private 
Monitoring (source - host)   2.379*** 0.061   
   (0.43) (0.45)   
Relative Banking 
Restrictions (source - host)     -0.096 -2.170*** 
          (0.26) (0.54) 
p-value for null hypothesis 
that the coefficients on 
regulation variables are 
equal across time periods 0.44 0.000 0.001 
Observations 461 461 348 348 326 326 
Standard errors in parentheses.  ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10; all estimations include dummy 
variables for time, source country and destination country. 
 
29 
 
Table 7A:  US Bank Lending to Banking Sector (as a percent of all lending to banking sector) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  UR lending to banking sector 
Common Language 3.1731** 3.0036* 3.0281* 2.9843* 2.9510* 
 (1.52) (1.62) (1.58) (1.77) (1.77) 
Distance 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Common Legal -1.6019 -1.3695 -1.0054 -1.2563 -1.1117 
 (1.13) (1.24) (1.21) (1.34) (1.35) 
Phone Calls 0.5638*** 0.5414*** 0.5062** 0.5172** 0.5240** 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) 
Genetic Distance  -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Relative Supervisory Power 
(source - host)   0.2798   
   (0.26)   
Relative Banking Restrictions 
(source - host)     0.1196 
     (0.10) 
Relative Private Monitoring 
(source - host)    0.0497  
    (0.07)  
Observations 128 126 117 113 108 
Number of destination 64 63 62 62 61 
Standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Includes dummy for time period and destination country random effects. 
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Table 7B: :  US Bank Lending to Public Sector (as a percent of all lending to public sector) 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  UR lending to public sector 
Common Language 0.6346 0.866 0.8428 0.0685 0.3062 
 (1.09) (1.15) (1.09) (1.02) (1.04) 
Distance 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Common Legal -1.5067* -1.7593** -1.7266** -1.4131* -1.3719* 
 (0.81) (0.89) (0.83) (0.77) (0.79) 
Phone Calls 0.6039*** 0.6264*** 0.6029*** 0.5815*** 0.6045*** 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) 
Genetic Distance   0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Relative Supervisory Power 
(source - host)    -0.2615   
    (0.21)   
Relative Banking 
Restrictions (source - host)      0.1531 
      (0.09) 
Relative Private Monitoring 
(source - host)     0.1587*** 
     (0.06)  
Observations 128 126 117 113 108 
Number of destination 64 63 62 62 61 
Standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Includes dummy for time period and destination country random effects. 
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Table 7C: :  US Bank Lending to Private Sector (as a percent of all lending to private sector) 
  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
  UR lending to private sector 
Common Language 2.5044* 2.1027 2.1265 1.939 1.7912 
 (1.28) (1.33) (1.34) (1.36) (1.36) 
Distance 0 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Common Legal 0.4405 0.0159 0.0796 0.0919 0.246 
 (0.96) (1.02) (1.03) (1.02) (1.03) 
Phone Calls 0.6751*** 0.7451*** 0.7273*** 0.7323*** 0.7472*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Genetic Distance   -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Relative Supervisory Power 
(source - host)    -0.1265   
    (0.21)   
Relative Banking 
Restrictions (source - host)      0.1735 
      (0.11) 
Relative Private Monitoring 
(source - host)     0.0574  
     (0.07)  
Observations 128 126 117 113 108 
Number of destination 64 63 62 62 61 
Standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Includes dummy for time period and destination country random effects. 
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Appendix Table 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Immediate Borrower Lending Ultimate Risk Lending 
                      
Common Language -0.2901 -0.1833 -0.1116 0.2453 0.4916 -0.3890 -0.3552 -0.1841 0.1896 0.3806 
 (0.470) (0.473) (0.504) (0.548) (0.590) (0.545) (0.542) (0.578) (0.624) (0.654) 
Continguous -0.7847** -0.7247* -0.5581 -0.4751 -0.5585 -0.3290 -0.4956 -0.3477 -0.1880 -0.2113 
 (0.380) (0.378) (0.391) (0.443) (0.460) (0.429) (0.424) (0.438) (0.500) (0.515) 
Distance -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common Legal 0.7401*** 0.7674*** 0.7308*** 0.7726*** 0.8111*** 0.6168** 0.5902** 0.4800* 0.5538* 0.5946* 
 (0.247) (0.247) (0.265) (0.291) (0.304) (0.260) (0.258) (0.277) (0.306) (0.318) 
Common Currency -0.1701 0.1560 -0.4738 -0.3493 -0.4085 -0.5532 -0.2033 -0.8548* -0.6260 -0.6772 
 (0.450) (0.452) (0.470) (0.518) (0.532) (0.455) (0.453) (0.467) (0.512) (0.525) 
Phone Calls 0.3372*** 0.3407*** 0.2666*** 0.2467*** 0.2458*** 0.4071*** 0.4377*** 0.3464*** 0.2989*** 0.2941*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.055) (0.056) 
Genetic Distance  0.0004 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000   0.0009** 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Destination Colony  4.3486*** 4.5619*** 3.4062*** 3.3259***   7.9939*** 7.0912*** 5.5520*** 5.5212*** 
  (0.893) (0.908) (0.977) (0.999)   (1.055) (1.034) (1.130) (1.152) 
Export Share 42.7611*** 42.4786*** 43.1479*** 44.3361*** 44.5219*** 36.2396*** 36.7610*** 38.0421*** 40.4201*** 40.3155*** 
 (2.790) (2.774) (2.812) (2.976) (3.074) (3.377) (3.339) (3.368) (3.573) (3.667) 
Relative Supervisory Power 
(source - host)   -0.0395      -0.0440   
   (0.186)      (0.196)   
Relative Private Monitoring 
(source - host)    -0.0596      -0.0754  
    (0.077)      (0.086)  
Relative Banking 
Restrictions (source - host)     -0.0697      -0.0888 
     (0.094)      (0.099) 
Observations 1,359 1,327 1,082 951 910 1,264 1,233 1,000 875 839 
R-squared 0.742 0.750 0.787 0.798 0.799 0.686 0.702 0.741 0.749 0.749 
Standard errors in parentheses.  ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%; all estimations include dummy variables for time, source and destination 
country 
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Appendix 2: 
 
List of BIS-reporting (source) countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia (FYR), Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States, plus the 
European Central Bank. 
 
List of recipient (destination, or host) countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Cayman Islands, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote D'Ivoire, Croatia, 
Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Falkland Islands 
(Malvinas), Faroe Islands, Fiji, Finland, France, French Polynesia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea, 
Korea (North) (People's Republic), Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macau, Macedonia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Papua 
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent, 
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Turks and 
Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vatican, Venezuela, Vietnam, Wallis and Futuna 
Islands, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
